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THE FDA PREAMBLE: A BACKDOOR TO
FEDERALIZATION OF PRESCRIPTION
WARNING LABELS?
CRISTINA RODRIGUEZ*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps one of the most compelling defenses today in
pharmaceutical labeling litigation is that of federal preemption.
The doctrine of federal preemption is grounded in the Supremacy
Clause, which sets forth that any state law conflicting with the
exercise of an enumerated federal power is preempted.! Although
the issue of federal preemption of state law is utilized as a strong
defense today, it was not until recently that this doctrine became
so highly debated in the realm of drug litigation. Recently, federal
agencies have increased the use of preambles as a way to attempt
preemption of state regulations or common law. This increase in
preemption has been coined as "backdoor federalization."2
In January 2006, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
issued a statement on labeling regulations for human prescription
drugs. The preamble to the January statement unequivocally
establishes the FDA's position on preemption by stating that
"under existing preemption principals, FDA approval of labeling
under the [Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act]... whether it be in the
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2. Catherine M. Sharkey, Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and
the Federalization of Tort Law, 56 DEPAuL L. REV. 227, 229 (2007); see also
Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53
UCLA L. REV. 1353 (2006) (explaining "backdoor federalization").
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old or new format preempts conflicting or contrary state law . The
FDA's recent position on federal preemption contrasts with its
former views, as set forth in 1998 and in 2000, which stated that
FDA approval does not have a preemptive effect on state failureto-warn claims.4
With such a definitive position on federal preemption of
pharmaceutical-related state tort claims, an increase in litigation
regarding the issue of federal preemption has ensued. Since the
publication of the FDA preamble, courts seem to be divided on
whether deference should be granted to the FDA preamble and the
agency's most recent position on preemption.
To date, Congress has remained silent on the issue of federal
preemption of prescription labeling claims. The Food Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which provides the FDA with the authority
to regulate the prescription drug industry, does not expressly
contain a preemption clause. Under general preemption analysis,
implied preemption occurs where state and federal law conflict,
where state law presents obstacles to accomplishing Congress's
purposes, or where Congress has so completely occupied the field
that there is no room for state law. Most common law state
prescription drug claims are not in direct conflict with federal law.
Furthermore, it is difficult to make the case (despite the FDA's
position) that actions brought under state common law present an
obstacle to accomplishment of the FDA's mission, or that Congress
intended to completely occupy the field of drug safety regulation.
This Article will examine the FDA's role in regulating drug
safety and explore its position on the preemptive power of FDA
Part II will provide an overview of the federal
regulation.
regulatory process of obtaining approval from the FDA to market
and sell prescription drugs and highlight some criticisms of this
Part III will discuss general preemption principles
process.
related to pharmaceutical labeling. Part IV will describe and
explore the FDA's current position on preemption, including
whether courts should defer to the FDA's preamble in its January
2006 statement. Part V will discuss the judicial response to the
FDA preamble. Finally, the politics of the FDA's evolving position
on preemption will be further explored.

3. Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933 (Jan. 24, 2006)
(emphasis added).

4. Prescription Drug Product Liability; Medication Guide Requirements,
63 Fed. Reg. 66378, 66384 (Dec. 1, 1998); Requirements on Content and

Format of Labeling

for Human Prescription

Drugs and

Biologies;

Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81082,

81103 (Dec. 22, 2000).
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II. BRINGING A NEW DRUG TO THE MARKET: CRITICISMS OF THE
FEDERAL REGULATORY PROCESS

In 1938, Congress enacted the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA) in response to the deaths of approximately one hundred
children from the consumption of an elixir sulfanilamide, a
medication that was formulated using anti-freeze.5 The FDCA
established that drug manufacturers must conduct animal toxicity
testing and submit safety data to the FDA prior to the approval of
a drug.6
In 1962, Congress enacted the Kefauver-Harris
Amendments to the FDCA, which increased the requirements for
toxicity testing and submission of safety information to the FDA.7
The Kefauver-Harris Amendments also required that substantial
evidence must be submitted to the FDA regarding the efficacy of a
drug.8
Today all prescription drugs in the United States must be
approved by the FDA. However, it is the responsibility of the
pharmaceutical company seeking to market a new drug to submit
evidence that it is safe and effective.9 The route a drug travels
from the laboratory into an individual medicine cabinet is quite
long. First, the drug must undergo preclinical (animal) testing."
Then, the drug sponsor submits an Investigational New Drug
Application with the drug's preclinical data to the FDA for
approval to conduct clinical (human) trials." A local institutional
review board that consists of a panel of scientists and nonscientists in hospitals and research institutions also approves the
clinical trial protocols. 2 Once the clinical data is collected, a drug
sponsor submits a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA. An
NDA includes all preclinical and clinical data analyses of the
proposed new drug.13 Submission of an NDA is the formal step

5. History of the FDA: The 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, U.S. FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/oc/history/historyoffda/section

2.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
6. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-397, § 360
(e)(c) (1938).
7. History of the FDA: Drugs and Foods Under the 1938 Act and Its
Amendments, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/oc/
history/historyoffda/section3.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
8. Id.
9. Drug Approval Application Process, CENTER FOR DRUG EVALUATION
AND RESEARCH, http://www.fda.gov/cder/regulatory/applications/ (last visited
Oct. 19, 2006).
10. The FDA's DrugReview Process:EnsuringDrugs are Safe and Effective,
From Test Tube to Patient:A Special Report from FDA Consumer Magazine,
U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/fdad/ special/test
tubetopatient/drugreview.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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that a drug company takes so that the FDA can consider a new
drug for marketing within the United States.
When the FDA approves a new drug, the agency has
determined that the benefits of the drug outweigh its risks.15
Although the FDA maintains one of the most rigorous drug
approval processes in the world, clinical trials cannot determine
every adverse drug effect."6 Due to the limited size and length of
pre-marketing clinical trials, only the most common adverse
effects will be identified and included on a drug's label.17 Thus, a
limited amount of information on determining possible adverse
effects of a new drug also limits the FDA's ability to evaluate
warning labels for potential new drugs that are submitted by drug
sponsors as part of an NDA.
Furthermore, the scientific standards utilized by the FDA to
determine if a drug is safe have been criticized, even by its own
officials."8 The FDA's review of a new drug depends substantially
14. Id.
15. MedWatch: Managing Risks at the FDA, From Test Tube to Patient:A
Special Report from FDA Consumer Magazine, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, http://www.fda.gov/fdac/special/testtubetopatient/medwatch.
html (last visited Oct. 19, 2006).
16. Stephen A. Goldman, Dianne L. Kennedy & Ronald Lieberman, Clinical
Therapeutics and the Recognition of Drug-Induced Disease, A MEDWATCH
CONTINUING EDUCATION ARTICLE,

1 (1995), http://www.fda.gov/medwatch/

articles/dig/ceart.pdf.
17. See id.,
9. (explaining that clinical trials do not provide for all
information on a drug's safety but rather are designed primarily for assessing
efficacy and risk-benefit ratio); see also Robert Temple, Commentary on "The
Architecture of Government Regulation of Medical Products", 82 VA. L. REV.
1877, 1886-87 (1996) (criticizing the argument that the FDA tends towards
excessive caution and towards the belief that the FDA's job is to prevent harm
to consumers, rather than facilitate innovative medical products). Dr. Temple
states:
[I]t is often said.., that FDA, because it will be blamed if a drug proves
more toxic than expected (and perhaps will be subjected to public, i.e.,
congressional, abuse), is excessively cautious and fails to weigh
appropriately the benefits of the drugs against their risks. This is so
much the conventional wisdom that even suggesting that it is an
unsupported myth seems almost impertinent. But myth it is and no one
has ever even attempted to demonstrate its truth, either through an
analysis of FDA decisions or, at least, by a comparison of FDA decisions
with decisions by other regulatory authorities.
Evidence of such excessive caution could perhaps be found in
applications that were not approved because the drugs were considered
unsafe. It is, in fact, relatively unusual for drugs to be rejected on safety
grounds.
Id.
18. FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First? Hearing Before
Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of David J. Graham, MD,
MPH, Associate Director for Science and Medicine, FDA Office of Drug Safety)
"[T]he scientific standards CDER [Center for Drug Evaluation Research]
applies to drug safety guarantee that unsafe and deadly drugs will remain on
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upon statistical tests. 19 Two statistical tests used to evaluate a
given drug are efficacy measures and safety measures. In general,
a drug is approved if it shows a ninety-five percent or greater
This statistical measure is
probability that it is effective."
reasonable; it sets a high standard so that the drug a patient
However, the statistical test for
receives actually works.
determining the safety of a drug may be problematic. Under the
safety statistical test, a drug will be considered unsafe only if it
can be shown that the drug is unsafe with ninety-five percent
This standard is extremely high and has been
certainty. 2'
compared to the legal standard of beyond a reasonable doubt."
The congressional testimony of Dr. David Graham, an Associate
Director for Science and Medicine for the FDA Office of Drug
Safety, illustrates this point with the following analogy:
If the weather-man says there is an 80% chance of rain, most people
would bring an umbrella. Using the CDER's [Center for Drug
Evaluation and Research] standard, you wouldn't bring an umbrella
23
until there was a 95% or greater chance of rain.
Others have criticized the FDA for its focus on industry
profits over public health concerns.24 More specifically, the FDA
has been criticized for what is called "agency" or "industry"
capture.2 For instance, the FDA relies on advisory committees
composed of outside experts who offer scientific and technical
advice on drug approvals.2 6 However, it is not uncommon that
committee members are scientists who have a direct financial
relationship to the company that manufactures the drug being
screened for approval. 27 For example, in a committee of thirty-two
outside experts selected to review the controversial class of drugs,
COX-2 inhibitors (including Vioxx), ten of the panelists had a
the US [sic] market." Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. "This is an incredibly high, almost insurmountable barrier to
overcome. It's the equivalent of 'beyond a shadow of a doubt.'" Id.
23. Id.
24. See FDA Fails to Protect Americans from Dangerous Drugs & Unsafe
Food, Watchdog Groups Say: Agency Captured by Industries It Should Be
Regulating, According to Rep. Waxman, Public Citizen, and CSPI, June 27,
2006, http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/print-release.cfm?ID=2227 (explaining
that the FDA should enforce the law, thereby placing public health concerns
ahead of profits).
25. See Robert Glicksman & Christopher H. Schroeder, EPA and the
Courts: Twenty Years of Law and Politics, 54-AUT LCPR 249, 264-68, 276-79
(1991) (discussing 'agency capture" and how it affects the integrity of
regulatory agencies).
26. FDA Fails to Protect Americans from Dangerous Drugs & Unsafe Food,
supra note 24.
27. Id.
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direct relationship with the drug manufacturers of COX-2
inhibitors.28
Recently, the U.S. House of Representatives released a report
that evaluated the FDA's enforcement responsibilities during the
Bush Administration.2 ' The report concluded that there has been
a decrease in FDA enforcement actions in the past five years.30
More specifically, there has been a decrease in the number of
warning letters issued for federal violations and a decline in the
number of seizures of mislabeled, defective and dangerous drugs.31
Even further, enforcement recommendations of field offices within
the FDA have often been rejected.32
The FDA has also been criticized for lacking a clear and
effective process for managing the oversight of post-market drug
safety issues." Although the FDA has the authority to withdraw
its approval of a drug on the market, it has only limited authority
to require that drug sponsors conduct specific actions such as postmarket safety studies. ' Thus, the FDA has to rely on the drug
sponsor to voluntarily conduct post-market safety studies.35
However, even if a drug sponsor begins to conduct a post-market
safety study, it oftentimes does not complete the study and the
FDA cannot enforce completion of the research.36
In light of strong FDA criticism, the agency has undertaken
some initiatives to improve drug safety. For example, the FDA
MedWatch program encourages health professionals to voluntarily
report adverse effects of a drug.37 Based on the voluntary reports
received, the FDA may take the following actions: issue safety
alerts, make labeling changes, require product withdrawals, send
letters to healthcare professionals, or require further postmarketing research." However, it may not be until after a drug
has been approved for sale to the public that one can determine
28. Id.
29. Comm. on Oversight & Gov't Reform, U.S. H.R., Prescriptionfor Harm:
The Decline in FDA Enforcement Activity (2006), available at http://over

sight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1074.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Drug Safety: Further Actions Needed to Improve FDA's Postmarket
Decision-making Process, Subcommittee on Heath, Comm. on Energy and
Commerce, House of Representatives, 2, 108th Cong. (2007) (statement of
Monica Crosse, Director, Health Care).

34. Id. at 5.
35. Id. at 9.
36. Id.
37. MedWatch: Managing Risks at the FDA, FDA CONSUMER MAGAZINE:
FROM TEST TUBE To PATIENT (4th ed. 2006), available at http://www.fda.

gov/fdac/speciall testtubetopatient/medwatch.html.
38. Id.
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whether the drug carries substantial risks. The FDA has also
implemented changes to its post-market drug safety decision
process. For example, the FDA has proposed revisions to its draft
policy on major post-market drug safety decisions.39 Also, the FDA
is in the process of developing a tracking system to oversee postmarket drug safety issues and is receiving guidance on the Office
of Drug Safety's role in scientific advisory committees." Despite
the FDA's efforts to make improvements on drug safety, the
reality is that every product the FDA approves carries some risks
that often go undiscovered until the product is on the market.
With so many risks and the dangers of adverse effects discovered
after a drug is placed on the market, state tort law may be an
important avenue of protection for citizens' health and well-being.
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The Supremacy Clause of the United States provides that
federal law "shall be the supreme Law of the Land."4 ' Thus, if any
state law conflicts with current federal law, the federal law
prevails. Federal preemption can be express or implied. Express
preemption occurs when Congress explicitly preempts state law.
Generally, a preemption clause in a statute will provide that
states "may not adopt conflicting 'requirements' or 'standards.'"4"
In contrast, implied preemption must be discerned from the
general purpose of a statute.4 3 There are two types of implied
preemption: field and conflict preemption. Field preemption
occurs when Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy
an entire field of lawmaking. With conflict preemption, an actual
conflict between state and federal law exists. There are two ways
to establish implied conflict preemption. First, state and federal
law may directly conflict such that it is impossible to comply with
both laws." Second, a conflict may exist when state law interferes
or "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." '
In the context of pharmaceutical labeling, federal preemption
is based upon the authority of the federal government. This
authority exists "in the form of drug approval adjudications by
[the] FDA," to supersede the powers of the states in determining
what prescription drug label warnings are required. 6 If a federal
39. Drug Safety: Further Actions Needed to Improve FDA's Postmarket
Decision-makingProcess, supra note 33, at 3.
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl.
2.
42. DAVID OWEN, PRODUCT LIABILITY LAw 897 (Thomson West 2005).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 898.
45. Id.
46. James T. O'Reilly, A State of Extinction: Does Food and Drug
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regulation does not prohibit a state claim, or if the claim does not
conflict with a federal regulation, then Congress probably intended
for the state claim to remain valid.47
Currently, Congress has not expressly preempted state
failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims. Thus, in the absence
of an express preemption clause, Congress did not intend general
preemption.
Without any delegation of authority concerning
preemption of prescription labeling laws to the FDA, Congress did
not intend for the FDA to make such decisions. Consequently,
implied preemption is the only possibility that may exist.
However, there is a presumption against finding implied
preemption without a clear sign of congressional intent.4
The only indication of congressional intent regarding
preemption in the context of pharmaceutical drugs is stated in the
"Effect on State Laws" provision of the 1962 amendments to the
FDCA:
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any
provision of State law which would be valid in the absence of such
amendments unless there is a direct and positive conflict between
such amendments and such provision of State law.49
Despite its clear conflict preemption language, the "Effect on
State Laws" provision has a limited application because it only
applies to the 1962 amendments of the FDCA as opposed to the
entire act. 50 Furthermore, the preemption provision of the 1962
amendments relates to issues of safety, effectiveness, and
reliability of prescription drugs and factory inspections - not
prescription drug labeling.
Notwithstanding the 1962
Amendment's limited application, it may be reasonable, by
analogy and extension, that the savings clause in the 1962
amendments suggests a general congressional intent that other
parts of the FDCA do not preempt state law in the absence of a
direct conflict.
The basic issue with respect to federal preemption of state
failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims can be expressed best
as whether Congress implicitly intended to prohibit state tort

Administration Approval of a Prescription Drug Label Extinguish State
Claims for Inadequate Warning?, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 287, 288 (2003).
47. OWEN, supra note 42, at 900.
48. Jackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 966 (D. Neb. 2006) (citing
Mo. Bd. of Examiners v. Hearing Help Express, Inc., 447 F.3d 1033 (8th Cir.
2006)).
49. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780, 793.
50. H.R. REP. No. 87-2526, at 26 (1962) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1962
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2927, 2935. "The conference substitute retains the House
provision but makes the provision applicable only to the amendments made by

this act to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act." Id.
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claims, and whose answer to that question - the FDA's or the
courts' - should prevail. The next sections discuss the FDA's
position and the judicial response.
IV. THE FDA's POSITION ON FEDERAL PREEMPTION

In the past decade, the FDA has issued several statements
that indicate its position on federal preemption of state failure-towarn tort claims. In general, the FDA's position on preemption
has shifted from one respecting state failure-to-warn labeling
claims, to a view that advocates federal preemption. The following
section discusses the FDA's former views and its current position
on federal preemption of state failure-to-warn prescription
labeling claims.
Part IV.A focuses on the FDA's views of
preemption prior to 2000. Part IV.B discusses the FDA's recent
2006 statement on human prescription drug labeling. Finally,
Part IV.C discusses deference to the FDA's recent statement on
preemption.
A. Priorto 2000

In general, prior to 2000, the FDA appeared to consistently
recognize that its regulations (promulgated through the FDCA)
did not preempt state law in the area of pharmaceutical drug
litigation. In its 1998 statement on new regulations regarding
consumer medication guides, the FDA stated that the "FDA's
regulations establish the minimum standards necessary, but were
not intended to preclude the states from imposing additional
labeling requirements. States may authorize additional labeling
but they cannot reduce, alter, or eliminate FDA-required
labeling."51 Basically, a state could make labeling standards more
stringent than the FDA, but could not reduce the FDA standards.
Later in December of 2000, the FDA released its proposed rules on
the labeling requirements for prescription drugs.52 The 2000
proposal explicitly stated that its regulations did not have a
preemptive effect on state failure-to-warn claims." Furthermore,
the FDA stated that its 2000 proposal did not have federalism
implications:
Because enforcement of these labeling provisions is a Federal
responsibility, there should be little, if any, impact from this
rule, if finalized, on the States, on the relationship between
the National Government and the States, or on the
51. Prescription Drug Product Liability; Medication Guide Requirements,
63 Fed. Reg. at 66384.

52. Requirements

on Content and Format of Labeling for Human

Prescription Drugs and Biologies; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product
Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81082.
53. Id. at 81103.
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distribution of power and responsibilities among the various
levels of Government.'
As the FDA came closer to publishing its 2000 proposed rules,
the agency received numerous comments expressing concerns
about the proposed labeling requirements and requests for a final
rule on prescription labeling stating, "FDA approval of labeling...
preempts conflicting or contrary State law, regulations, or
decisions of a court of law."55 The FDA determined that the
labeling of prescription drugs had become too complex and was
becoming increasingly difficult for doctors to decipher.56
Furthermore,
product
liability
litigation
had
"caused
manufacturers to become more cautious and include virtually all
known adverse event information, regardless of its importance or
its plausible relationship to the drug." 7 The FDA also indicated
that it became aware of some product liability suits that
threatened its ability "to regulate manufacturer dissemination of
risk information for prescription drugs."' As a result, the FDA
released its final rule on labeling requirements of prescription
drugs on January 18, 2006 ("January 2006 Statement"), 59 a rule
that would supposedly clarify the preemption issue with respect to
pharmaceutical litigation.
B. The FDA's 2006 Statement on Human
PrescriptionDrug Labeling
In response to requests for a different statement about federal
preemption of state failure-to-warn claims, the FDA issued the
new labeling requirements for prescription drugs and reversed the
agency's position on preemption of state court warning claims. ° In
the preamble, the FDA unequivocally stated that, "under existing
preemption principles, FDA approval of labeling under the act...

54. Id.
55. McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. 05-1286,

2006 WL 2819046, at *8

(D.N.J. Sept. 29, 2006) (quoting Requirements on Content and Format
Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
3922, 3933-34).
56. Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for Human Prescription

Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3972.
57. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drugs and Biologies; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product
Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. at 81083.
58. Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for Human Prescription

Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934.
59. Joseph J. Leghorn, Christopher Allen, Jr., & Tavares Brewington,
Defending an Emerging Threat: Consumer Fraud Class Action Suits in
Pharmaceuticaland Medical Device Products-Based Litigation, 61 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 519, 525 (2006).
60. Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3933-34.
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whether it be in the old or new format, [the Federal Drug and
Cosmetic Act] preempts conflicting or contrary state law.""'
Furthermore, in the preamble, the FDA explained that state law
decisions
rejecting preemptive
authority
of the labeling
requirements "rely on and propagate interpretations and frustrate
the agency's implementation of statutory mandate." 2
The FDA further reasoned that it was the "expert Federal
public health agency charged by Congress" to ensure that drugs
are safe and effective.' In the FDA's view, state law requirements
could undermine its role as the expert Federal agency and its
ability to regulate the safety and effectiveness of prescription
drugs.'
It was the FDA's position that, ultimately, state law
requirements could lead to labeling that does not portray a
"product's risks, thereby potentially discouraging safe and effective
use of approved products."6" Furthermore, the FDA added:
State actions are not characterized by centralized expert evaluation
of drug regulatory issues. Instead, they encourage, and in fact
require, lay judges and juries to second-guess the assessment of
benefits versus risks of a specific drug to the general public - the
central role of the FDA - sometimes on behalf of a single individual
or group of individuals. That individualized reevaluation of the
benefits and risks of a product can result in relief - including the
threat of significant damage awards or penalties - that creates
pressure on manufacturers to attempt to add warnings that FDA
has neither approved nor found to be scientifically required. This
could encourage manufacturers to propose "defensive labeling" to
avoid State liability, which, if implemented, could result in
scientifically unsubstantiated warnings and underutilization of
beneficial treatments.66
In its January 2006 Statement, the FDA provided a list of the
types of claims that would be preempted:
(1) Claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by
failing to put in Highlights or otherwise emphasize any information
the substance of which appears anywhere in labeling;
(2) [C]laims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by
failing to include in an advertisement any information the
substance of which appears anywhere in the labeling...

61. Id. at 3934 (emphasis added).
62. Leghorn, supra note 59, at 525 (quoting Requirements on Content and
Format Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71
Fed. Reg. at 3934).
63. Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934.
64. Id. at 3935.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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(3) [Claims that a sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing
to include contraindications or warnings that are not supported by
evidence that meets the standards set forth in this rule... ;
(4) [Claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by
failing to include a statement in labeling or in advertising, the
substance of which had been proposed to FDA for inclusion in
labeling, if that statement was not required by FDA at the time
plaintiff claims the sponsor had an obligation to warn (unless FDA
has made a finding that the sponsor withheld material information
relating to the proposed warning before plaintiff claims the sponsor
had the obligation to warn);
(5) [C]laims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by
failing to include in labeling or in advertising a statement the
substance of which FDA has prohibited in labeling or advertising;
(6) [Claims that a drug's sponsor breached an obligation to plaintiff
by making statements that FDA approved for inclusion in the
drug's label (unless FDA has made a finding that the sponsor
withheld material information relating to the statement).67
The agency emphasized that not all state law actions are
preempted.68 The state law claims that should be allowed include
claims based on state requirements that parallel federal
requirements.69 For example, a claim that alleges failure of a drug
manufacturer to comply with a federal requirement would not be
preempted by the FDCA. °
The FDA's January 2006 Statement was definitive regarding
its position on federal preemption of state tort claims related to
Since the publication of the FDA
pharmaceutical litigation.
preamble, courts have been divided on whether deference should
be granted to the FDA preamble and its position on preemption.
C. Deference to the FDA's 2006 Statement on
PrescriptionDrugLabeling
How much deference is afforded to a federal agency's
statements has been heavily debated in the realm of
administrative law. The FDA's 2006 statement on prescription
drug labeling certainly does not escape such a debate, especially
with respect to its preamble.
There are two levels of deference that courts commonly apply
to agency statements: Chevron and Skidmore deference." Chevron

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. For a discussion of Auer deference, see Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452
(1997). Auer deference (deference given to an agency's statements that clarify
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deference can be summarized into a two-part test. First, if
congressional intent is clear, courts and agencies must give effect
to that intent. 2 Second, when there is silence or ambiguity in a
statute, courts must give considerable weight to an agency's
construction of a statutory scheme to the extent that it is
reasonable.73
However, a finding of reasonableness does not
necessarily mean that an agency's interpretation is the only
interpretation possible or that an agency's interpretation should
be the same as that of a court's.74 Thus, the Court has held that
great deference should be given to the interpretations of statutes
and regulations by the agencies that administer those statutes and
regulations."5
Instead of applying Chevron deference, a court may choose to
apply Skidmore deference to an agency's statement.
With
Skidmore deference, a court should take into account an agency's
decision.
More specifically, the Supreme Court stated in
Skidmore:
We consider that the rulings, interpretations and opinions of the
Administrator under this Act, while not controlling upon the courts
by reason of their authority do not constitute a body of experience
and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly
resort for guidance. The weight of such a judgment in a particular
case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control. 6
Thus, Skidmore deference provides that an agency's
statement or interpretation is persuasive, but not controlling.
Consequently, Skidmore deference is a much weaker form of

ambiguities in its own regulations) will not be addressed in this paper as most
courts have focused on Chevron and Skidmore deference with respect to the
issue of federal preemption of state failure-to-warn prescription labeling
claims.
72. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
843 (1984).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 842-43.
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines
Congress has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the
court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific
issue, the question for the court is whether the agency's answer is based
on a permissible construction of the statute.

Id.
75. Id. at 844.
76. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
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deference than Chevron deference. In conclusion, the level of
deference that is applied, either Chevron or Skidmore, can
influence whether a court defers to an agency's statement or
interpretation of a statute.
Although the rules on how to apply Chevron or Skidmore
deference are clear, the rules on when to apply either level of
deference are more vague. Until recently, a "force of law" test that
was established in United States v. Mead Corp., determined when

to apply Chevron or Skidmore deference." The Court in Mead held
that Chevron deference should be applied when it appears that
Congress delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying
the force of law and the agency interpretation was carried out in
exercise of that authority.78 Thus, Chevron deference would be
applied in formal rulemaking adjudications as well as informal
notice-and-comment rulemaking. 9 In instances that lack the force
of law (such as policy statements, agency manuals and
enforcement guidelines), Chevron deference does not apply.8" In
this situation, an agency's interpretation may warrant some
deference and, as a result, Skidmore deference can be applied.
With Skidmore deference, an agency's thoroughness, experience,
and expertise are relevant and may persuade the court to defer to
the agency. There is definitely more flexibility when a court
applies Skidmore deference - essentially, the court may choose to
afford significant or minimal deference to the agency.
The Mead opinion clarified that an agency receives deference
for rulemaking and formal adjudication. Also, an agency may
receive Chevron deference for more informal statements if the
agency is exercising law-making authority.81 However, a recent
decision by the United States Supreme Court suggests that the
"force of law" test is not dispositive for Chevron deference.82
Instead, a new test for agency deference was discussed that
considers the interpretive method used by the agency and the
nature of the question at issue.'

United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001).
Id. at 226-27.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 234.
81. WILLIAM F. FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER,
77.
78.
79.
80.

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 402 (3rd ed. 1997).

82. In Barnhartv. Walton, the Supreme Court stated:
Indeed, Mead pointed to instances in which the Court has applied
Chevron deference to agency interpretations that did not emerge out of
notice-and-comment rulemaking. It indicated that whether a court
should give such deference depends in significant part upon the
interpretive method used and the nature of the question at issue.

535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (internal citations omitted).
83. Id.
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Currently, it is unclear if a multi-faceted inquiry utilizing the
"force of law" test, the new test focusing on the "interpretive
method used" and the "nature of the question at issue" is
necessary to determine which level of deference is applicable.
Furthermore, it is undetermined if the new test should replace the
"force of law" test when considering what level of deference should
be applied to non-legislative rules. What seems to be clear is that
the court will use Chevron deference if Congress intended an
agency's interpretation or decision to receive deference.' Thus, if
it is reasonable to assume that Congress intended the courts to
defer to an agency's interpretation, then Chevron deference will be
applied."
With respect to the FDA's 2006 statement on prescription
drug labeling, courts have differed as to what level of deference (if
any) to apply to the preamble of the FDA's statement. 6 In making

84. FUNK, ET. AL, supra note 85, at 401.
85. Id.

86. See Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, No. CIV-04-1762D, 2008 WL
169021, at *13 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 17, 2008) ("The Court finds that, on the
particular facts of this case, deference to the relatively broad scope of
preemption set forth in the Preamble and amicus briefs filed since 2000 is not
required because this case presents a narrower issue."); In re Zyprexa
Products Liability Litigation, 489 F. Supp. 2d 230, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("The
Preamble accompanying the Final Rule is not entitled to deference under
Chevron or Auer, and controls this court only insofar as it has the 'power to
persuade.'.. . The Preamble's assertion of preemption is not persuasive.");
Perry v. Novartis Pharma. Corp, 456 F. Supp. 2d 678, 683 (E.D. Penn. Oct. 16,
2006) (quoting Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 97 (2d Cir.
2006)).
Thus, to the degree that the FDA seeks to address ambiguities in the
FDCA or in its own regulations, we will give that opinion great weight.
Where, however, the agency attempts to 'supply, on Congress's behalf,
the clear legislative statement of intent required to overcome the
presumption against preemption,' no deference is warranted.
Id.; see Bextra and Celebrex Marketing Sales Practices and Product Liability
Litigation, No. M:05-1699, 2006 WL 2374742, slip op., at *8 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
16, 2006) (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64).
[T]he fact that the agency had from time to time changed its
interpretation of a term does not mean no deference is accorded the
agency's view: 'On the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed
rulemaking, must consider varying interpretations and wisdom of its
policy on a continuing basis.'
Id.; see Sullivan v. Wyeth, No. 20033314F, 2007 WL 1302589, at *4 (Mass.
Super. Ct. April 12, 2007) ("The 'Preemption Preamble' and the FDA amicus
brief are not entitled to the heightened deference afforded to an agency's
rules."); Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078, j 25 (Vt. Oct. 27,
2006) ("Under either standard, the FDA's statement deserves no deference.
We have already concluded ... that Congress intended the FDCA to preempt
only those state laws that would make it impossible for manufacturers to
comply with both federal and state requirements."); Colacicco v. Apotex, 432 F.
Supp. 2d 514, 526 (E.D. Penn. 2006) (noting that Chevron deference was
accorded here based on the reasoning that "a revised interpretation by an
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such an analysis, one could apply either the "force of law" test or
the newer test that incorporates an evaluation of the "interpretive
method used" and the "nature of the question at issue."
Under the "force of law" test, the first determination is
whether preambles are considered law. The Code of Federal
Regulations indicates that a preamble is an advisory opinion,
defined as "any portion of a Federal Register Notice other than the
text of a proposed or final regulation, e.g., a notice to
manufacturers or a preamble to a proposed or final regulation."87
Moreover, "an advisory opinion may be used in administrative or
court proceedings to illustrate acceptable and unacceptable
procedures or standards but not as a legal requirement."8 Thus,
the preamble is not considered law. Without having a force of law,
the preamble will most likely be entitled to limited deference.
Three recent federal cases have also concluded that the FDA's
preamble is an advisory opinion and warrants either no deference 89
or limited deference.'
Under the newer test, the FDA's "interpretive method used"
and the "legal question at issue" is considered in determining what
level of deference is warranted. To date, no court has applied this
newer test to determine what level of deference should be afforded
to the FDA's preamble. However, one can evaluate the legal
question of issue. Can an agency delegate to itself the power to
preempt state failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims?
Certainly heightened deference should be afforded to the FDA's
interpretation of its own statutes and regulations as it is an
authority on matters of safety of prescription drugs. However, the
FDA has not been granted the authority, nor is it an expert, in the
allocation of state and federal powers.9' Given the aforementioned,
it seems reasonable that limited deference should be applied to the
FDA's preamble.
When determining what level of deference (if any) should be
applied to the FDA's preamble, some courts have by-passed the
"force of law" test and the newer test considering "the interpretive
method" an agency uses and "the legal question at issue" in favor
agency is [still] entitled to deference because an initial agency interpretation
is not instantly carved in stone"); McNellis, WL 2819046, at *7-8 (noting that

the preamble is not entitled to deference because the FDA's position on
preemption has not been consistent); Weiss v. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co.,
64 F. Supp. 2d 666, 674 (E.D. Ky. 2006) ("FDA's position has not been
consistent and is therefore entitled only to Skidmore deference.").
87. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (d)(1) (2000).
88. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85 (i) (2000) (emphasis added).
89. Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 683-84.
90. Weiss, 464 F. Supp. 2d at 673-74; In re Vioxx Products Liability
Litigation, 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 787 (E.D. La. 2007).
91. See infra Part V.B, (discussing whether the FDA has the authority to
decide matters of preemption).
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of focusing on Congress's intent (or lack of intent) to delegate the
authority to the FDA to allocate state and federal power. The
Central District of California, in Bextra, gave full deference to the
FDA's preamble by reasoning that the FDA has implied authority
to determine which state laws conflict with its regulations because
Congress delegated the responsibility of implementing the FDCA
to the FDA.92 Similarly, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in
Colacicco gave full deference to the FDA preamble, but based its
reasoning on other factors.93 The court based its opinion on recent
precedent where the Supreme Court deferred to the FDA's
preemption position when questioning whether the FDCA
preempts state law.94 However, in the precedent that the Colacicco
court relied upon, the courts deferred to the FDA's interpretation
of its own regulations, not statements on preemption.
The
Colacicco court also emphasized Chevron precedent indicating that
an agency can change its position and still be entitled to
deference."

Unquestionably, one should begin an analysis of determining
what level of deference should be afforded to the FDA's preamble
by evaluating Congress's intent to delegate to the FDA the power
to preempt state prescription labeling laws. To date, there is no
express intent from Congress to delegate to the FDA the power to
preempt state failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims.
Furthermore, "the issuance of the Preamble does not change the
fact that Congress has not expressed an intent to preempt state
failure-to-warn laws with respect to pharmaceutical drugs."96
Thus, the question is whether there is an implied intent from
Congress to supply the FDA with the power to preempt state law.
Undoubtedly, the FDA has the authority to implement the
FDCA; however, this authority does not include the power to make
decisions of allocation of state and federal powers. Although some
courts, such as the court in Bextra, extrapolate and extend the
implied power to implement the FDCA to include a power to make
decisions of allocation of state and federal powers, implied
preemption seems unlikely. Congress's primary goal in enacting
the FDCA is to "protect consumers from dangerous products."97
With this goal in mind, it is unlikely that Congress would agree to
preemption of state failure-to-warn claims when the FDCA lacks a

92. Bextra, 2006 WL 2374742, at *7.
93. Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 525-32.
94. Id. at 525 (citing Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996); Buckman
Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee, 531 U.S. 341 (2001); Hillsborough County
v. Automated Med. Labs Inc., 471 U.S. 707 (1985)).
95. Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 525.
96. McNellis, 2006 WL 2819046, at *9.
97. Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078, 25 (quoting United
States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689, 696 (1948)).
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remedy for an injured consumer.98 Thus, the preemption preamble
would not be entitled to heightened deference. Even if one could
make a strong argument for the presence of an implied intent from
Congress to delegate preemption powers of state law to the FDA,
the preamble is still not afforded heightened deference under the
"force of law" or the newer test incorporating "the interpretive
method" and "the legal question at issue," as previously discussed.
Instead, the FDA's preamble merely has the power to persuade
any decisions made by the courts and consequently receive
Skidmore deference at best.
A court's view of a regulatory agency can be a key component
in its analysis of litigation involving that agency. To examine
whether state failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims should
be preempted, the degree of deference afforded to the FDA's
January 2006 Statement must be determined. The Supreme
Court has addressed arguments of whether an FDA regulation
preempts state law in four cases over the past thirty years. 99 In
each of those cases, the FDA's statements have been accorded
significant weight in determining if its substantive rules preempt
state law. °° However, it is important to recognize that in these
recent cases the Court deferred to the FDA's interpretation of its
own regulations, not the FDA's statement on preemption. Also,
unlike the latter precedents, the FDA's preamble is not a
regulation and there is no question of a conflict between the
preamble and state law. To date, the U.S. Supreme Court has not
ruled on the position of FDA preemption in state failure-to-warn
pharmaceutical labeling claims, and lower court holdings on
prescription drug preemption vary. Regardless of the argument

98. See infra Part V.C (discussing the absence of a remedy for consumers
under the FDCA).
99. Eric G. Lasker, How Will FDA's New Label Rule Impact Drug
Litigation?10 ANDREWS DRUG RECALL LITIG. REP. 9, 1, 3 (2006).
100. Id.; see Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 543 (1977) (giving
deference to the FDCA standard and held that state law should yield to
federal law); Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Labs. Inc., 471 U.S. 707,
714-15 (1985) (ruling against preemption of local ordinances governing
collection of blood plasma from paid donors). The Supreme Court recognized
that the "FDA's statement is dispositive on the question of implicit intent to
pre-empt unless either the agency's position is inconsistent with clearly
expressed congressional intent or subsequent developments reveal a change in
that position." Id.; see also Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 495-96 (1996)
(recognizing the "unique role" the FDA has in determining an FDA
regulation's preemptive effect). Furthermore, the Supreme Court recognized
that "state requirements are pre-empted 'only' when the FDA has established
'specific counterpart regulations or ...other specific requirements applicable
to a particular device." Id.; see also Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm.,
531 U.S. 341, 342 (2001) (favoring preemption of state law claims of fraud on
the FDA which conflicted with the "FDA's responsibility to police fraud

consistently with the Administration's judgment and objectives").
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that is set forth on the position of FDA preemption of state failureto warn pharmaceutical labeling claims, each side references FDA
statements to support their argument.'0 '
V. THE EFFECT OF THE FDA PREAMBLE IN THE COURTS
Whether a court rules in favor of or against federal
preemption of state failure-to-warn claims largely depends on the
amount of deference afforded to the FDA preamble. There are
several recurring arguments when the issue of federal preemption
of state prescription drug labeling is at stake. A discussion of
these arguments follows.
A.

The FDA's Lack of Consistency on the Issue of Preemption

As discussed previously, the FDA changed its position on
preemption between 2000 and 2006. Opponents of preemption of
state failure-to-warn labeling claims emphasize that the FDA's
interpretation of regulations in 2006 in its Final Rules on
Prescription Drug Labeling are completely inconsistent with the
FDA's 2000 Proposed Rules, and because of this change, deference
should not be accorded to the FDA preamble."' The primary
reason for opposing acceptance of the FDA's 2006 preamble is
based on the position that the U.S. Supreme Court has taken on
inconsistent interpretations of an agency's statute and its
regulations. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that a court should
give less deference to an agency's interpretation of its regulations
if the interpretations have not been consistent.'0 3
Although a court may not grant great deference to an agency's
position when an agency has shown inconsistency in its
interpretations,"° proponents of federal preemption of state
failure-to-warn labeling claims argue that there is no justification
for precluding deference to an agency's interpretation simply
because the interpretation has not been the agency's "longstanding
position."'
Furthermore, an agency's interpretation that is

101. Lasker, supra note 103.
102. McNellis, 2006 WL 2819046, at *8.
103. See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 417 (1993)
("[The consistency of an agency's position is a factor in assessing the weight
that position is due"). Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 714. "The FDA's
statement is dispositive on the question of implicit intent to pre-empt unless
either the agency's position is inconsistent with clearly expressed
congressional intent or subsequent developments reveal a change in that
position." Id.
104. See In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 273
("The Preamble's assertion of preemption is not persuasive .... Prior
interpretations of the FDCA by the FDA contradict the current view adopted
by the agency.").
105. Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 531 (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 863-64).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[41:161

categorized as "new" or "changing" should not be suspect. 1" The
Court has also recognized that an agency's view may change over
time as the agency acquires more knowledge and experience
regarding the interrelationship of its regulations and state laws. 17
With regard to the differences in the FDA's 2000 Proposal and the
FDA's 2006 Final Rule, the FDA explained that the same
longstanding principles of preemption were being applied, but to a
different set of facts. °8 Since its publication of the 2000 Proposal,
the FDA recognized that there were several instances in which
product liability lawsuits "directly threatened the agency's ability
to regulate manufacturer dissemination of risk information for
prescription drugs in accordance with the act.""°
The latter
explanation has been one of the FDA's principle reasons for
shifting its position on preemption of failure-to-warn state claims.
Despite an inconsistency in the FDA's position of preemption of
failure-to-warn state claims, some courts have accepted this
inconsistency and change of view. 10°
B. The FDA's Lack of Authority on the Issue of Preemption
Certainly, deference should be accorded to the FDA on
matters regarding safety of prescription drugs. The FDA is
uniquely qualified to determine the risks and benefits of
prescription drugs that are placed on the market. The underlying
reasoning for this view is that "the subject matter is technical; and
the relevant history and background are complex and extensive.""'
Therefore, the FDA is more "likely to have a thorough
understanding of its own regulation and its objectives. 1" Although
some courts have viewed the FDA as uniquely qualified to
comprehend the likely impact of state requirements,13 the FDA
does not have the authority to make decisions about its power to
preempt state law. Deference to the FDA's position should only be
warranted when the agency "speaks in the exercise of its authority

106. Id.
107. Bextra, 2006 WL 2374742, at *8.

108. Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006).
109. Robert N. Weiner, PharmaceuticalLaw: 2006: Across the Product Life
Cycle: Preemption and the FDA Preamble, Practicing Law Institute, 878
PLJPAT 847, 860 (Oct. 2006) (quoting Requirements on Content and Format

Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 3934).
110. See Colacicco, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 529 (extending deference to the FDA's
position).
111. Bextra, 2006 WL 2374742, at *6 (quoting Geier v. American Honda
Motor Corp., 529 U.S. 861, 883 (2000)).

112. Id.
113. Id.
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'to make rules carrying the force of law.'""' Therefore, deference to
the FDA's position should be accorded when the FDA addresses
ambiguities in the FDCA or in its own regulations"5 - not matters
of preemption. Simply put, the FDA is not an expert in the
allocation of federal and state power. A recent decision reinforces
the latter when addressing the issue of FDA preemption of state
failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims. The decision clearly
and correctly stated that where the agency "attempts to 'supply, on
Congress's behalf, the clear legislative statement of intent
required to overcome the presumption against preemption,' no
deference is warranted.""' There is no question that significant
deference should be afforded to the FDA's interpretation of its
governing statute and regulations, but matters of federal and state
allocation of power are outside of the purview of the FDA.
C. Preemption -Absence of a Remedy for
Consumers Under the FDCA
The states have a long-standing interest in protecting the
health and welfare of their citizens. Because the FDCA lacks a
remedy for an injured consumer," 7 a finding of preemption will not
provide such a remedy, and will foreclose traditionally favored
remedies that "have been historically reserved by the states.""8
Thus, the state's interest in protecting its citizen's health and wellbeing will be curtailed. Furthermore, with a near elimination of
most prescription drug failure-to-warn claims, drug manufacturers
will be absolved of liability from such claims by simply complying
with the FDA regulations. With immunity from liability of failureto-warn prescription labeling claims, a manufacturer would not
only reduce their liability exposure, but they would have reduced

114. Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 683 (quoting Mead, 533 U.S. at 226-27).
115. Id.
116. Id.; In re Aredia and Zometa Products Liability Litigation, No. 3:06MD-1760, 2007 WL 649266 at *6 n.14 (M.D. Tenn., Feb. 27, 2007) (citing
Perry, which noted that the FDA preamble did not have preemptive effect
because "[Clongress, not federal agencies, have the power to preempt state law
claims"); Kelley v. Wyeth, No. 20033314F, 2007 WL 1302589, at *3-4 (Mass.
Super. April 12, 2007) (rejecting the FDA preamble and the position in the
Colacicco amicus brief as "unpersuasive" because the agency could not "supply
clear legislative intent on Congress's behalf' and because the agency's
interpretation had changed frequently diminishing the "persuasive force of the
argument").
117. Kelley, 2007 WL 1302589, at *5; see also Vioxx, 501 F. Supp. 2d at 788
("b]ecause there are no federal remedies for individuals harmed by
prescription drugs, a finding of implied preemption in these cases would
abolish state law remedies and would, in effect, render legally impotent those
who sustain injuries from defective prescription drugs.")
118. Marilyn P. Westerfield, Federal Preemption and the FDA: What Does
Congress Want?, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 263, 272 (1989).
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insurance costs for new drugs."9 However, the idea that a drug
manufacturer merely has to comply with FDA regulations in order
to avoid liability seems to go against the thrust of the policy
statements of the Third Restatement of Torts which state that
compliance with a federal regulation does not necessarily preclude
a finding of a product defect. 2° The latter statement refers to
compliance with a federal statute or regulation that is found to be
nonpreemptive."' There is no indication that Congress intended to
deprive injured consumers of a form of compensation that has long
2
been available without any legislative enactment or comment.1 2
Although Congress did delegate the authority to ensure the safety
and efficacy of prescription drugs to the FDA, there is nothing to
support the proposition that Congress has delegated the power of
general preemption of state law to the FDA. In fact, the 1962
Amendments to the FDCA are the only indication of any
preemption of state law with respect to prescription drug labeling
in the Act. The amendments state that absent a direct and
positive conflict, nothing in the amendments are intended to
invalidate state law. 12 Moreover, in the preamble of the FDA's
January 2006 statement on labeling of prescription drugs, the
FDA cites itself as the authority on its position of preemption of
state failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims."2 However, even
119. O'Reilly, supra note 46, at 289.
120. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIABILITY § 4(b) (1998).
[A] product's compliance with an applicable product safety statute or
administrative regulation is properly considered in determining whether
the product is defective with respect to the risks sought to be reduced by
the statute or regulation, but such compliance does not preclude as a
matter of law a finding of product defect.

Id.
121. See id. at cmt. e. This portion of the Restatement:
addresses the effects of compliance with a federal statute or regulation

found to be nonpreemptive. It addresses the question, under state law,
of the effect that compliance with product safety statutes or regulations

-

federal or state

-

should have on the issue of product defectiveness.

Subsection (b) reflects the traditional view that the standards set by
most product safety statutes or regulations generally are only minimum

standards. Thus, most product safety statutes or regulations establish a
floor of safety below which product sellers fall only at their peril, but
they leave open the question of whether a higher standard of product

safety should be applied. This is the general rule, applicable in most
cases.

Id.
122. Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 684 (citing Bates v. Dow Agrosciences, 544
U.S. 431, 449 (2005)). "If Congress had intended to deprive injured parties of a
long available form of compensation, it surely would have expressed that
intent more clearly." Id.
123. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No 87-781, 76 Stat. at 793.
124. See Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for Human

Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg at 3935 (explaining
the interplay between state law actions and FDA's role of regulating drugs).
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the FDA's preamble does not claim that Congress has granted the
FDA the power to make decisions on federalism. The bottom line
is that Congress likely did not intend to preempt state common
law remedies when there is an absence of any other possible
remedy."' Given the lack of a remedy for consumers in the FDCA,
the FDA's position is not particularly persuasive nor is it entitled
to deference.
D. Preemption - Blocking Additional Warnings
on PrescriptionLabels

One of the most common issues debated is whether
manufacturers can add or strengthen label warnings. Opponents
of the FDA Preamble's position on preemption maintain that the
FDA labeling requirements represent a minimum safety standard
that allows manufacturers to add or strengthen prescription labels
without FDA approval.
A strengthened label would not be
considered "false or misleading."
Instead, state consumer
protection laws would complement rather than frustrate the FDA's
job."6 Recent cases have cited the rulings from state courts that
recognize that the FDA sets forth only minimum safety
standards127

"State law actions also threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed role as the expert
Federal agency responsible for evaluating and regulating drugs. State actions
are not characterized by centralized expert evaluation of drug regulatory
issues." Id.
125. See Zyprexa ProductsLiability Litigation, 489 F. Supp. 2d at 275 ("The
need for a 'clear statement from Congress' is imperative where, as in this case,
a finding of preemption 'will foreclose a remedy that was traditionally
available and for which federal law provides no substitute.'") (quoting Perry,
456 F. Supp. 2d at 684). "Where congress has preempted the states'
traditional regulation of public health, it has done so explicitly. Two federal
statutes passed in this area contain express preemption provisions, in clear
contrast to the FDCA." Id. at 276. "While a direct statement of legislative
intent is not essential for preemption, it would be odd for Congress to include
express preemption provisions in amendments to the FDCA regarding statelaw tort claims in certain contexts (i.e., for medical devices) if it intended all
FCA claims to be preempted." Id.
126. Jackson, 432 F. Supp. 2d at 969 (noting Witczak v. Pfizer, Inc., 377 F.
Supp. 2d 726, 732 (D. Minn. 2005)).
127. Id. at 967 (citing Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 876, 882
(E.D. Tex. 2005). "Numerous courts over the years have recognized that the
FDCA and its associated regulations set out minimum requirements that drug
manufacturers must follow which may be supplemented by state tort laws
which are stronger." Id.; Witczak, 377 F. Supp. 2d. at 732. "Federal labeling
laws are minimum standards; they do not necessarily shield manufacturers
from state law liability." Id.; Bextra, No. M:05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742,
at *4 (quoting Motus v. Pfizer Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1091 (C.D. Cal.
2000)). "[M]ost courts have found that FDA regulations as to design and
warning standards are minimum standards which do not preempt state
law ... failure to warn claims." Id.
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While the FDA recognizes that a manufacturer may
strengthen a label warning and distribute a drug with additional
labeling changes, the FDA emphasizes in its preamble that it has
the authority to disapprove of the changes to the label or even
order the manufacturer to stop distributing the drug. 28
Furthermore, a different label from the one dictated by the FDA
would be considered "false and misleading."'29 The FDA preamble
specifically addresses this issue by stating that the "FDA
interprets the act to establish both a 'floor' and a 'ceiling,' such
that additional disclosures of risk information can expose a
manufacturer to liability under the act if the additional statement
is unsubstantiated or otherwise false or misleading." ° Moreover,
"[sitate law attempts to impose additional warnings can lead to
labeling that does not accurately portray a product's risk, thereby
potentially discouraging safe and effective use of approved
products or encouraging inappropriate use and undermining the
objectives of the act."...
In recent rulings on the issue of federal preemption of failureto-warn state prescription labeling claims, a narrower rule in
determining if a drug is misbranded has been adopted. 2 The
narrow rule allows "state law to require the addition of warnings
so long as there has been no specific FDA determination as to the
sufficiency of the scientific evidence to support a particular
warning."'
In other words, a plaintiff may proceed with a state
law failure-to-warn prescription labeling claim so long as the FDA
has not already rejected the plaintiffs proposed warning.
E.

The FDA Preamble as an Advisory Opinion

Opponents of the FDA's position on preemption of failure-towarn state prescription labeling claims argue that the FDA
preamble "is not a binding portion of the regulations, but is
instead an advisory opinion."1 4 As stated in the Code of Federal
128. Bextra, 2006 WL 2374742, at *8.
129. Id. at *9.
130. Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935.
131. Id.
132. Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 685; Dobbs, 2008 WL 169021, at *13.
133. Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 685; see also Dobbs, 2008 WL 169021, at *13.
Where the FDA has evaluated scientific evidence regarding an alleged
risk associated with a drug, has considered whether that evidence
warrants a labeling warning, and has expressly rejected the need for
such warning as not supported by credible evidence, a state law
determination that such a warning is required creates a conflict for the
manufacturer as between federal and state law, and imposes

inconsistent federal and state obligations.
Id.
134. Id. at 683; see also Vioxx, 501 F. Supp. 2d 776, 787. "At best, the
preamble merely offers an opinion on the viability of the plaintiffs' state-law
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Regulations, "any portion of a Federal Register notice other than
the text of a proposed or final regulation" is considered an advisory
opinion.
Although an advisory opinion must be followed by the
agency until it is amended or revoked, "it can be changed at any
time and a change does not require notice."'36 Moreover, the
preamble's words contradict the plain language of the regulations
in the 2006 Final Rule on Prescription Drug Labeling.137 More
specifically, the preamble sets forth that the FDA's labeling
requirements are not minimum standards and that the
regulations "establish a floor and a ceiling."'38 The FDA explains
in its preamble that additional disclosures of risk information that
are unsubstantiated could lead to manufacturer liability and
would "not necessarily be more protective of patients."39 In
contrast, the 2006 Final Rule on Prescription Drug Labeling states
that a manufacturer should revise a label to "include a warning as
soon as there is reasonable evidence of an association of a serious
hazard with a drug; a causal relationship need not have been
proved.'4°
Proponents of the FDA preamble and its preemption position
argue that the preamble is a formal statement of the FDA and
that deference can be accorded to an agency's preamble. Although
the FDA cannot impose legal requirements through advisory
opinions, regulatory interpretations do not lack legal force."
However, whether the FDA preamble carries a legal force is a
prominent factor in determining what level of deference should be
applied by the courts to its position on preemption of state failureto-warn claims. But as discussed previously, the FDA preamble is
4
not considered law and more likely deserves Skidmore deference.1 1
VI. THE POLITICS OF THE FDA's EVOLVING
POSITION ON PREEMPTION

The reasons behind the FDA's change in position with respect
to preemption are not entirely clear. Perhaps a change in political
claims given the existence of the federal regulatory scheme as a whole; it does
not purport to interpret any specific statutory or regulatory provision, nor is it
a regulation itself." Id.
135. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(d)(1) (2006).
136. 21 C.F.R. § 10.85(g) (2006).
137. McNellis, 2006 WL 2819046, at *6.
138. Id. at *7 (citing Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935).
139. Id.
140. Specific Requirements on Content and Format Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2006).
141. Weiner, supra note 112, at 860.
142. See supra Part IV.C (analyzing what level of deference should be
applied to the FDA's preamble of its 2006 statement on human prescription
drugs and biological products).
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climate and problems within the FDA's drug approval process may
have influenced the FDA's recent shift toward preemption of state
failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims. However, between
1998 and 2004, the pharmaceutical industry spent $673,701,988
on lobbying expenditures.
In addition, drug company
contributions to President Bush during the 2000 and 2004
elections totaled $801,532.1" Of course the change in rationale
from 2000 to 2006 may not be entirely due to a change in the
political landscape and the FDA may certainly have other reasons
to support its position on preemption of state failure-to-warn
prescription labeling claims.
Problems with the FDA drug approval process may also
provide some insight for the FDA's position on preemption. As
previously explained, when a new drug is placed on the market, it
carries some risk despite being FDA-approved. These risks may
14
not be known until the drug is widely available on the market. 1
The FDA's MedWatch program has been utilized so that health
professionals receive voluntary reports regarding possible adverse
effects of a drug. 41 It is questionable whether a voluntary program
relying upon overworked physicians and other healthcare
professionals provides an efficient method for the discovery of
adverse effects of a new drug. 147 Certainly, it is understood that
the FDA's concern with additional warnings on prescription labels
relates to tension between its potentially conflicting goals of
balancing "the need for safety with a desire to encourage
widespread use of effective treatments."" However, if an adverse
risk is reported through the MedWatch program, or if initial
research studies conclude that an adverse risk may be associated
with a particular drug, it would be beneficial to place a warning on
the prescription label. With all of the current information about
the possible adverse effects of a drug at hand, a physician will be
better able to determine the appropriate drug treatment/therapy
for his/her patients.
In addition to the fact that a new drug on the market may
carry risks, and in light of the FDA's view on additional warnings
143. Lobby Watch: Pharmaceuticals and Other Health Products, The Center
for Public Integrity: Investigative Journalism in the Public Interest,
http://www.publicintegrity.org/lobby/profile.aspx?act=industries&in=78

(last

visited Dec. 8, 2006).
144. Pharmaceutical

Manufacturing:

Top 20

Presidential

Candidates,

http://www.opensecrets.org/industries/recips.asp?Ind=H4300&Cycle=2004&re
cipdetail=P&Mem=N&sortorder=U (last visited Dec. 8, 2006).
145. MedWatch, supra note 15.

146. Id.
147. See Goldman, et. al, supra note 16 (discussing the effectiveness of
depending on physicians and healthcare professionals voluntarily to report
adverse effects of drug).
148. Perry, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 685.
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for a prescription drug label, other problems may occur within the
FDA drug approval process. Take for instance the recent litigation
on Vioxx, a pain relief medication used for treatment of arthritis
and acute pain conditions that was removed from the market
following an association with an increased risk of heart attacks
and strokes. The congressional testimony of Dr. David Graham,
an Associate Director for Science and Medicine for the FDA Office
of Drug Safety, highlights some of these other problems within the
FDA drug approval process. 49 In his testimony, Dr. Graham
described research that he conducted in collaboration with Kaiser
Permente concluding that high-dose Vioxx significantly increased
the risk of heart attacks and sudden death, and that high doses of
the drug should not be prescribed or used by patients.15" When Dr.
Graham informed his office, the FDA Office of Drug Safety, of the
results and his intention to present the data at an international
conference, he was "pressured to change [his] conclusions and
recommendations" and threatened that if he did not make the
appropriate changes to his presentation, he would not present the
results at the meeting."' At the same time, Dr. Graham received
an e-mail from the Director of the FDA Office of New Drugs
suggesting that "since the FDA was not contemplating a warning
against the use of high-dose Vioxx, [his] conclusions should be
changed.""'
Furthermore, Dr. Graham wrote a manuscript
reporting his research on Vioxx, and it was approved for
publication in a prestigious journal after extensive peer-review."3
Despite acceptance of the manuscript, the senior managers in the
Office of Drug Safety did not initially grant clearance for its
publication. 54

The actions of the FDA relating to Dr. Graham raise the
appearance of a conflict of interest within FDA drug approval
process. The FDA is the same agency charged with approving new
drugs to go on the market (FDA Office of New Drugs), and it is
also responsible for taking regulatory action after a new drug is
placed on the market (FDA Office of Drug Safety). According to
Dr. Graham, the Office of New Drugs "is the single greatest
obstacle to effectively protect the public against safety risks.""'
When the Office of New Drugs is informed by the Office of Drug
Safety that a safety issue has occurred, the immediate reaction is

149. See FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting PatientSafety First?,supra note 18
(discussing Dr. Graham's personal experiences and opinions on the FDA
approval process).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
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"almost one of denial, rejection, and heat."" Dr. Graham suggests
that the second greatest obstacle in protecting the public against
safety risks is "often the senior management within the Office of
Drug Safety, who either actively or tacitly goes along with what
the Office of New Drugs wants.""7
With the internal problems of the FDA's drug approval
process and the influence of politics on the FDA, consumers will
need a method of keeping a check on the FDA. Adversary
litigation provides a way to check and balance problems with the
FDA drug approval process that can affect consumers. However, if
deference is given to the FDA's position on preemption, adversary
litigation will not be an option.
VII. CONCLUSION
Although it is Congress' authority to determine if state
failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims should be preempted,
it has not spoken on this issue. In the absence of any direction
from Congress and with an increase in litigation related to federal
preemption of prescription drug labeling failure-to- warn claims,
the U.S. Supreme Court will ultimately have to address this issue.
Regardless of how the U.S. Supreme Court stands on federal
preemption of state failure-to-warn prescription labeling claims,
its decision will have a significant impact on pharmaceutical
litigation. More importantly, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision
will bind lower courts even if Congress does not speak on the issue
of preemption.

156. Id.
157. Id.

